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RUSSIAN DUMPING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN THE
SEA OF JAPAN:
AN OPPORTUNITY TO EVALUATE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LONDON CONVENTION 1972
James R. McCullagh
Abstract: By dumping 900 tons of radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan on
October, 13, 1993, the Russian navy violated the moratorium on low-level radioactive
waste dumping of the London Convention (the international treaty controlling ocean
dumping). However, legal liability under the London Convention, the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and international customary law arguably
does not attach to this activity. Indeed, even though the London Convention was
amended in November of 1993 to prohibit all ocean dumping of radioactive waste,
Russia remains legally entitled to use the ocean as a disposal site for low-level wastes as
a result of its formal objection to the amendment. Further, it is suggested that activity
and ecosystem-specific regulations merely transfer the risks associated with the activity
and may actually result in greater environmental harm. For this reason, the London
Convention and indeed all international agreements should consider the global impacts of
environmental regulations prior to prohibiting an activity.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment evaluates the current effectiveness of international
regulations over ocean dumping of radioactive wastes ("radwastes") and
questions the environmental soundness of prohibiting ocean disposal of
low-level radioactive wastes. It appears that the precautionary approach,
which allows activities to be regulated before proof of harm is established,'
was instrumental in enabling the international community to prohibit ocean
dumping of low-level radwaste. However, this Comment uses the 1993
prohibition of ocean dumping of all radioactive wastes by the parties to the
London Convention 2 (formerly referred to as the London Dumping
I See generally Bernard Weintraub, Science, International Environmental Regulation, and the
Precautionary Principle: Setting Standards and Defining Terms, I N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 173 (1992);
Gregory Fullem, Comment, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental Protection in the Face of
Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAME L. REv. 495 (1995).
2 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters, Dec.
29, 1972, [1975], 26 U.S.T. 2403, [hereinafter London Convention]. On November 12, 1993, parties to the
London Convention adopted a worldwide prohibition on the dumping of all radioactive wastes. Countries
Agree to Bans on Dumping of Radioactive, Industrial Wastes at Sea, 218 DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) d-7,
Nov. 15, 1993, available in WESTLAW, BNA-ENV Database. [hereinafter Countries Agree to Ban]; See
Amendments to The Annexes to The Convention on The Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
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Convention) to illustrate the potential danger in adopting a precautionary
approach on an ecosystem-specific basis. Restricting the precautionary
approach to a single activity in a single ecosystem ignores the fact that risks
to human health and the environment have not been eliminated but merely
transferred to another ecosystem. Thus, proper application of the precau-
tionary approach requires a global evaluation of risk.
Recently released information detailing past Russian violations of
ocean dumping regulations, 3 in addition to the precarious nature of the
current Russian radwaste disposal program, 4 warrants evaluating the envi-
ronmental soundness of international ocean dumping regulations. In
addition, the risks associated with radioactive waste disposal remain as the
use and development of nuclear technology continues despite the lack of
adequate permanent and safe disposal sites.
Ocean disposal was once thought to be an easy, cheap, and safe
method for radwaste disposal.5 Increasing scientific understanding of the
physical, chemical, and biological processes of oceans, popular perceptions
of the dangers of radioactivity, and the increasing use of precautionary
principles in environmental regulations have all contributed to increasingly
prohibitive regulations on ocean dumping of radioactive waste.
Suspicion of Soviet use of the ocean as a dumping ground for radio-
active waste was confirmed in 1993 when Russia released a white paper
disclosing the extent and location of its past dumping activities.6 In
October 1993, the Russian navy was observed dumping 900 tons of low-
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 Concerning Disposal at Sea of Radioactive Wastes and Other Radioactive
Matter, Resolution LC.51(16) (Nov. 12, 1993) [Feb. 20, 1994] [hereinafter Amendments].
3 William J. Broad, Soviet Dumping of A-Waste, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Apr. 27, 1993, at A 1,
available in WESTLAW, FARNEWS Database; Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste
Disposal in Seas Adjacent to the Territory of the Russian Federation, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Moscow, 1993) [hereinafter Facts and Problems]. Russia detailed the dumping of
18 decommissioned nuclear reactors and 13,150 containers of radioactive waste. Russia estimates it
dumped approximately 2.5 million curies of radioactive waste (where one curie is equal to the amount of
radiation given off by one gram of radium or the disintegration of 37 billion atoms per second), which is
almost twice the total previously thought to have been dumped at sea by the rest of the nuclear nations
from 1946 to 1982. The amount of radioactivity in curies dumped in the ocean by other countries in
decreasing order are: Britain (948,042), Switzerland (119,441), United States (94,598), Belgium (57,306),
France (9,551), Netherlands (9,082) Japan (417), Sweden (88), New Zealand (28), Germany (5), and Italy
(5). South Korea has also dumped 115 containers of radioactive waste at sea but the level of radioactivity
was not reported. Id
4 See Jeffrey Canfield, Soviet and Russian Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic Marine
Environment: Legal, Historical, and Political Implications, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 353 (1994).
5 See John W. Kindt, Ocean Dumping, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 335 (1984).
6 Facts and Problems, supra note 3.
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level liquid radioactive wastes into the Sea of Japan. 7 In 1994 Russian
objections to a permanent ban on ocean dumping of low-level radioactive
wastes further heightened international concern about the legality of
Russia's dumping activities. 8
This Comment contends that while Russia's 1993 low-level radwaste
dumping did not conform to international standards, its actions were consis-
tent with plausible interpretations of international law. Part II of this
Comment provides background information on the development of ocean
dumping regulations, the historical development of regulating ocean
dumping of radioactive wastes, and on international law controlling ocean
disposal of radwaste. Part III evaluates the international legality of Russia's
actions in dumping low-level radwastes into the Sea of Japan in 1993. Part
IV describes the problems associated with an activity and ecosystem-
specific approach to environmental regulations and suggests that in order to
effectively minimize the global risk to human health and the environment, a
proper application of the precautionary approach should consider both the
direct and indirect global impacts of an activity.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of International Regulation of Ocean Dumping
The search for areas and methods of safe disposal of the radioactive
byproducts of nuclear technology coincided with the development of
nuclear power in the 1940s. The United States pioneered ocean disposal of
radioactive wastes in 1946,9 continued dumping wastes until 1970,10 and
7 Japan Demands End to Russian Nuclear Dumping; Moscow Stands Firm, Saying Parties Were
Forewarned, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Oct. 18, 1993, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database
[hereinafter Japan Demands End]. The Sea of Japan is the body of water bordered by Japan on the east
and South Korea, North Korea, and Russia on the west. South Korea has recently requested that the Sea of
Japan be renamed to the Far East Sea, but the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) has refused
to accept the proposed name change, citing that most international maps use the name "Sea of Japan."
South Korea Proposes Renaming of Sea of Japan, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 25,
1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, BBCSWB File.
8 Declarations of Non-Acceptance of Amendments, LC 18/2 (1994) [hereinafter Declarations of
Non-Acceptance]. "The Russian Federation, in a declaration of 18 February 1994, expressed that: '... the
Russian Federation does not accept the amendment to Annexes I and 11 to the Convention ... as contained
in Resolution LC.51(16) ... Russia will, however, continue its endeavors to ensure that the sea is not
polluted by the dumping of wastes and other matter, the prevention of which is the object of the provisions
contained in the above-mentioned amendment ...' Id.
9 Broad, supra note 3.
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remained a proponent of ocean disposal of low-level radwaste until 1993.11
Given the fact that the ocean's capacity to absorb wastes was considered
limitless, 12 it is not surprising that many of the earth's nuclear powers have
disposed of radioactive waste in the ocean.13
However, the general awakening to environmental concerns in the
early 1970s and the impacts from industrial development and population
growth revealed that the assimilative capacity of the oceans was finite. 14
The international community identified the need to regulate the use of the
oceans as a public dump and as a result, the Convention on the Prevention
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (The London
Convention) was signed by sixty states in 1972.15
The delegates at the London Convention recognized that "marine
pollution originates in many sources, such as dumping and discharges
through the atmosphere, rivers, estuaries, outfalls and pipelines,"'16 but
limited the scope of their discussions "to control the pollution of the sea by
dumping."17
B. History of Ocean Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Ocean dumping of high-level radwaste was prohibited in the original
London Dumping Convention,' 8 but developing acceptable protocol for
ocean disposal of low-level radwaste has proven to be much more difficult.
In general, states with nuclear capabilities favored ocean disposal of low-
10 George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Protecting the Seas From Nuclear Pollution, 33 S. CAROLINA L. R.
197,201 (1981).
11 Administration to Call for Global Ban on Dumping of Low-Level Waste in Oceans, INT'L ENVT.
DAILY (BNA), Nov. 8, 1993, available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED Database [hereinafter Administration].
12 Kindt, supra note 5, at 335 (citing Council on Envtl. Quality, Envtl. Quality - 1980 15 (1980)).
13 See Broad, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14 Kindt, supra note 5, at 335. The growing awareness and concern for the environment is also
evidenced by the increase in the level and number of regulations attempting to preserve and protect the
environment. E.g., WILLIAM RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, viii (2 Ed. 1994). Multilateral
environmental treaties were signed as a rate of 1.23 annually from 1920 to 1973 but increased to 4.2
annually for. the period from 1974 to 1990. Id. § 1.1 (Supp. 1995).
I London Convention, supra note 2. As of 5 May, 1994, 72 countries (including 67 of the 149
countries that are members of the International Maritime Organization ("IMO")) have ratified the London
Convention. IMO NEWS #2 (1994). This Convention has formerly been referred to as the "London
Dumping Convention" but the Parties to the Convention recently agreed to change the informal name to
the "London Convention of 1972." WILLIAM BURKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, DOCUMENTS AND
NOTES 4-115 (1995).
16 London Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.
17 London Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.
18 London Convention, supra note 2, annex i. See also Kindt, supra note 5, at 343.
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level radwaste, while states without nuclear capabilities opposed such
activities.1 9 Countries possessing nuclear technology were concerned with
developing economic methods for disposing of their growing stockpiles of
radioactive waste and most nuclear powers had utilized the oceans as a
disposal site for low-level radwastes. 20 On the other hand, non-nuclear
coastal states feared that ocean disposal of radwaste would detrimentally
affect the ocean resources upon which they depend.2 1
Motivations for ocean dumping of radwaste include limited terrestrial
options of geographically disadvantaged countries, an inability or unwill-
ingness to commit the necessary economic resources required for safe
containment and land disposal, a belief that the ocean is a common resource
constituting an inexpensive disposal option, and a belief by some that ocean
dumping does not threaten the health of the marine environment. 22 For
example, Russia has vast sparsely populated terrestrial resources and is
therefore not limited by suitable terrestrial options for radwaste disposal.
However, the Russians have not committed sufficient economic or technical
resources to develop safe land based storage facilities.23 As a result, it is
likely that ocean disposal of radioactive wastes remains attractive to the
Russians from both an economic and risk sharing standpoint.
On the other hand, Japan, is heavily dependent on the ocean for
transportation24 and food,25 but has limited natural resources. Japan utilizes
19 See Jon Van Dyke, The United States and Japan in Relation to The Resources, The Environment,
and The People of The Pacific Island Region, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 217, 223 (1989). From a cost-benefit
analysis, ocean disposal allows nuclear states to externalize the costs associated with nuclear energy by
spreading the risks of radioactive byproducts throughout the vast expanse of the ocean. Non nuclear
coastal states can be expected to object to sharing the risk of radioactive waste disposal as they receive
none of the benefits associated with nuclear technology. See John W. Kindt, International Environmental
Law and Policy: An Overview of Transboundary Pollution, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 583, 587 (1986).
20 Judith Spiller & Cynthia Hayden, Radwaste at Sea: a New Era of Polarization or a New Basis for
Consensus?, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 345, 347 (1988). "Beginning in the late 1940's, the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, and South Korea had all disposed of low-level wastes at sea." Id.
21 1d. at 347.
22 See generally Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, An End to Radioactive Waste Disposal 'at Sea'?,
MARINE POLICY, Apr. 1986, at 119.
23 See George Lobsenz, Russia Counts Radioactive Costs of Cold War, 24 Energy Daily 1 (1996)
available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database. Radioactive discharges from Russia's three nuclear
reprocessing plants alone are reported to be 1.7 billion curies, which dwarf both the 80 million curies
released in the Chernobyl accident and the 2.5 million curies dumped in the oceans. Id.
24 See generally Baruch Boxer, Marine Environmental Protection in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk,
20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 193 (1989). "Japan's maritime fleet of 37,189,376 Gross Registered Tons
(1985) is the world's largest, except for Liberia's and Panama's largely flag-of-convenience registrations."
Id. at 199.
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nuclear energy to satisfy a portion of its energy demands and therefore
shares concerns regarding the safe storage of radioactive wastes with other
nuclear states. However, developing suitable terrestrial disposal sites is
more difficult for Japan than other nuclear nations as a result of its limited
land resources, relatively dense population, and extensive vulnerability to
seismic perturbations.26 As a result, even though contaminated sea food
would have disastrous effects on Japan's population, Japan routinely
expressed an interest in pursuing ocean dumping of radwaste until 1993.27
Indeed, the current restrictions on ocean disposal of radioactive
wastes can be traced back to Japan's 1979 announcement that it planned to
dump low-level radwaste in the Pacific 900 kilometers southeast of Tokyo
and 100 kilometers north of the nearest island in the commonwealth of the
Mariana Islands. 28 Japan never commenced dumping operations as a
temporary moratorium on ocean dumping of radioactive wastes was imple-
mented by the parties to the London Convention in response to objections
from Pacific island nations. 29
In 1983, at the Seventh Consultative Meeting of the London
Convention, the Pacific island nations of Nauru and Kiribati attempted to
convert the temporary moratorium into a permanent prohibition. 30
However, opposition to prohibiting all ocean dumping of low-level
radwaste came from the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Japan,
Switzerland, and the United States.3 1 Convention members postponed
voting on a permanent prohibition, but agreed that all countries would
25 With an annual per capita consumption of 66.6 kilograms, Japan has the world's biggest appetite
for fish. Michael Parfit, Diminishing Returns, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 1995, at 2, 12. Japan imports
more than 400 different types of seafood daily from 60 countries on 6 continents. T.R. Reid, The Great
Tokyo Fish Market Tsukyi, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 1995, at 41, 44.
26 Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 224.
27 Peter Hadfield & Debora MacKenzie, Nuclear Dumping at Sea Goads Japan Into Action, NEW
SCIENTIST, Nov. 6, 1993, at 6.
28 Spiller & Hayden, supra note 20, at 346. It has been suggested that Japan may have joined the
London Convention in 1980 as a way to give legitimacy to Japan's ocean dumping plans. Van Dyke,
supra note 19, at 223.
29 Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 223.
30 Spiller & Hayden, supra note 20, at 347; see also George C. Kasoulides, State Responsibility and
Assessment of Liability for Damage Resulting from Dumping Operations, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 497, 499
(198811 Spiller & Hayden, supra note 20, at 347. While the United States had ceased ocean disposal of
radwaste in 1970 and had enacted domestic bans for ocean disposal of low level radioactive waste, it
remained opposed to international prohibitions on low-level waste disposal until 1993. The reservation
against an international prohibition has been attributed to the Navy wanting to preserve the option of
scuttling nuclear-powered submarines at sea and thinking that it would be more difficult to change
international law. Administration, supra note 1I.
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refrain from ocean disposal of radioactive wastes pending the outcome of a
scientific review.32 The resulting scientific panel produced an inconclusive
report in time for the Ninth Consultative Meeting of the London Convention
in September 1985, 33 and consequently the attending parties extended the
moratorium on dumping low-level wastes for an indefinite period pending
further review. 34
Despite no new scientific evidence on the dangers of ocean disposal
of low-level radioactive wastes, the parties to the London Convention
amended the Convention in 1993 to permanently prohibit ocean dumping of
all types of radioactive wastes. The following three events help explain
why the prohibition occurred in 1993. First, the parties at the Ninth
Consultative Meeting in 1985 agreed that review of radioactive waste
dumping restrictions would evaluate political, legal, economic, and social
aspects in addition to scientific aspects of radwaste disposal. 35 Second, the
Convention adopted the principles of the precautionary approach in
November of 1991.36 Third, the Russian disclosure of past ocean dumping
transgressions and the Sea of Japan dumping incident both occurred in 1993
prior to the London Convention meeting.
Expanding the scope upon which regulations could be based to
include social and political concerns in addition to scientific and technical
matters, combined with growing acceptance of the precautionary approach,
allowed the parties to the Convention to react to Russia's actions by perma-
nently prohibiting ocean disposal of radioactive waste, despite the lack of
supporting scientific data. 37 However, the effectiveness of enacting a
permanent prohibition is currently unknown. Russia filed an objection to
32 Disposal of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea, Resolution LDC. 14(7) (1983)
(available in THE LONDON DUMPING CONVENTION: THE FIRST DECADE AND BEYOND 207 (1991)
[hereinafter THE FIRST DECADE]. The moratorium was both voluntary and non-legally binding. Id at 104.
33 Kasoulides, supra note 30, at 499 (citing Report of Intersessional Activities relating to the
Disposal of Radioactive Wastes at Sea, including the Final Report of the Scientific Review, LDC/9/4, June
24, 1985).
34 Dumping of Radioactive Wastes at Sea, Resolution LDC.21(9) (1985) (available in J.M. Bewers &
C.J.R. Garrett, Analysis of the Issues Related to Sea Dumping of Radioactive Wastes, MARINE POLICY, Apr.
1987, at 105, 124; THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32, at 208, 209.)
35 Id.
36 The Application of a Precautionary Approach in Environmental Protection Within the Framework
of the London Dumping Convention, Resolution LDC.44(14) [hereinafter LDC.44(14)]. See BURKE, supra
note 15, at 4-115. "The adoption of the precautionary approach constitutes a shift from the traditional
assimilative capacity approach where disposal of waste at sea is permissible unless proof of harm [is
established]." Id
37 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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the prohibition and is therefore not bound by the Convention's total prohi-
bition on radioactive dumping. 38
C. International Law Pertaining to Ocean Disposal of Radioactive
Waste
The safe operation of nuclear reactors and disposal of the associated
radioactive wastes is of worldwide concern. Even though nuclear accidents
and atomic testing may occur entirely within the sovereign territory of one
state, the potential for transboundary pollution results in international
concern over the effects of radioactive emissions from such operations. 39
In addition to specific prescriptions set forth in the London
Convention, nation states may also be subject to regional agreements, the
prescriptions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"),40
and general principles of customary law. While customary law applies to
all states and sets the floor for acceptable international behavior, regional
agreements, UNCLOS, and the London Convention only govern the legality
of actions conducted by states that have expressly agreed to abide by their
terms and conditions.
1. The London Convention
The London Convention governs actions on "all marine waters other
than the internal waters to States," 4 1 and pertains to any deliberate disposal
at sea of wastes, vessels, aircraft, platforms, or other matter.42 Thus, parties
. 38 France, Belgium, Russia, China, and the United Kingdom abstained from the vote. Countries
Agree to Ban, supra note 2. Only Russia filed the required opposition within 100 days. Declarations of
Non-Acceptance, supra note 8. The import of Russia's opposition is discussed infra Part C. l.a.
39 See Kindt, supra note 19.
40 UN Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982) [Nov. 16, 1994], 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). [hereinafter Law of the
Sea]. Eighty three states have ratified or acceded to the treaty as of December 1, 1995. (current
membership status is available on the World Wide Web at gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/los/unclosstatus/
Ios82.rat).
41 London Convention, supra note 2, art. III, § 3.
42 London Convention, supra note 2, art. III, § l(a). However, "dumping" for the purposes of the
London Convention does not include: "(i) the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived
from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea and their
equipment, other than wastes or other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-
made structures at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment
of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or structures: (ii) placement of matter for
a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of
the Convention." London Convention, supra note 2, art. IIl, § I(a).
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to the London Convention have relinquished sovereignty over regulating
intentional disposal (not incidental to the operations of vessels or platforms
or caused by emergency)4 3 of substances within the State's territorial
waters.
The parties to the London Convention recognized that effective inter-
national control over dumping activities required the ability to adapt to
future developments. As a result, the Convention included prescriptions for
the regular convening of consultative meetings, 44 as well as prescriptions
for amending the Convention in the original agreement. The following two
sections explain the provisions for amending the Convention, and the short-
comings of Convention enforcement provisions.
a. Provisions for Amending the Convention
The procedure for amending the London Convention depends on
whether the amendment affects the body of the convention or one of the
three annexes that list specially regulated material and the criteria to be used
in issuing dumping permits. Amendments to the body of the Convention
enter into force after two-thirds of the Parties have accepted the
amendment 45 and are not binding on a contracting party without express
acceptance. 46 Amending an annex must be based on scientific or technical
considerations and must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the
contracting parties present at the meeting.47 Amendments to annexes are
binding on all parties on the 100th day after approval, unless the Party
expressly states that it does not accept the amendment.4 8
By providing mechanisms to amend the Convention, the parties
recognized the desirability of the ability to change regulations as the need
arises. Allowing member states to opt out of subsequent provisions respects
43 The exemption of waste incidental to operations of vessels and dumping by emergency pertains to
both the discharge of radioactivity from nuclear powered vessels and the radioactive contamination
resulting from submarine accidents. See generally Facts and Problems, supra note 3 (describing
radioactive releases from the normal operation of submarines as well as details on several nuclear
accidents).
44 London Convention, supra note 2, art. XIV, § 3.
45 London Convention, supra note 2, art. XV, § 2.
46 London Convention, supra note 2, art. XV, § I(a).
47 London Convention, supra note 2, art. XV, § 2 (n.b. At least with respect to evaluating
radioactive waste disposal, the strict requirement for considering only scientific and technical
considerations was broadened to include political, legal, economic, and social factors. See Bewers &
Garrett supra note 32, at 124).
48 London Convention, supra note 2, art. XV, § 2.
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the sovereignty of each party and may result in greater membership as states
will not be concerned that they will be held to future regulations with which
they disagree. However, opt-out provisions also threaten the uniformity of
a Convention as the possibility exists that individual member states will
concurrently be subject to different regulations.4 9 Indeed, this is the present
situation governing the dumping of radwaste as a result of Russia's formal
objection to the 1993 amendment to annex I that prohibits all ocean
dumping of radioactive material.5 0
Prior to the prohibition of all types of radioactive waste dumping in
November 1993, "high level radioactive wastes" 51 were included in annex I
-"the black list"-which lists substances prohibited from ocean disposal.5 2
Dumping of all other radioactive material was subject to the requirements of
annex II-"the gray list"-and required a special permit prior to ocean
disposal. 53 The authority to issue special permits is granted to each of the
contracting parties subject to criteria stated in annex II154 and article V(2).55
49 See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOLYE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 14
(1992) (stating that opt out procedures in other environmental treaties undermine their effectiveness).
W0 Declarations of Non-acceptance, supra note 8.
51 The exact nature of high level radioactive wastes was not defined in the LDC but the International
Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") defines high level waste as:
(1) irradiated reactor fuel; liquid wastes from the first solvent extraction cycle of chemical
reprocessing of irradiated reactor fuel, or equivalent processes; and solidified forms of such
wastes; and (2) any other waste or matter of activity concentration exceeding: (a) 5 x 10-5 TBq
kg-I for alpha-emitters; (b) 2 x 10-2 TBq kg-I for beta/gamma-emitters with half lives of
greater than I year (excluding tritium); and (c) 3 TBq kg-I for tritium and beta/gamma-emitters
with half-lives of I year or less. The above activity concentrations shall be averaged over a
gross mass not exceeding 1000 tons.... A Bequerel (Bq), the standard international unit of
radioactivity, [is] equal to the number of radioactive disintegrations taking place in a material
per second. I terabeqerel (TBq) equals I x 1012 Bq or 27 curies .... Low level radioactive
wastes [] are then defined as not being high level wastes. The above definition, based on
activity concentrations, differs slightly from the U.S.'s for [high-level radioactive waste]: 'the
highly radioactive material resulting from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and containing a
combination of transuranic wastes (atomic numbers greater than 92) and fission products in
concentrations that require permanent isolation.
Spiller & Hayden, supra note 20, at 359 n. 4.
52 London Convention, supra note 2, art. IV, § I(a). The actual listing of prohibited compounds is
found in annex I. London Convention, supra note 2, annex I.
53 London Convention, supra note 2, art. IV, § l(b). The actual listing of specially controlled
substances is found in annex II. London Convention, supra note 2, annex I1.
54 London Convention, supra note 2, annex Ill. Annex III is divided into three sections. Section A
lists eight characteristics of the matter to be dumped and includes: the total amount and average
composition of the matter to be dumped, the form of the material to be dumped, the chemical, biochemical,
and biological properties (solubility, density, oxygen demand, presence of viruses, bacteria, parasites) of
the matter, toxicity, persistence, accumulation, susceptibility to physical, chemical and biochemical
changes, and the probability of detrimentally affecting the marketability of other marine resources. Section
B lists several criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of the dumping site and method of deposit. Some
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The adoption of resolution LC.51(16) by the contracting parties to the
London Convention during the Sixteenth Consultative Meeting amended
annex I and II and moved all "[r]adioactive wastes or other radioactive
matter" to the black list.
b. Enforcement
Among activities that are exempted from the provisions of the
London Convention are activities necessitated by emergency 56 and actions
by state vessels. 57 The duty to ensure that activities comply with the
London Convention is delegated to the state where the vessel is registered
("flag state"), the state where the waste was loaded ("port state"), or the
state having jurisdiction over the area where the dumping occurred ("coastal
state").58 In addition, each party is required to prevent and punish conduct
in contravention of the Convention.5 9 Even though mandatory language is
used in both of the above mentioned sections, there are no provisions for
sanctions in the event a state chooses to not enforce either or both of the
provisions. 60 As a result of the lack of a mechanism to enable international
enforcement of a rogue party's actions, the mandatory prescriptions for
ensuring compliance are ineffective.
of the included criteria are: the location of the dump site in relation to other areas, the rate of disposal, the
methods of packaging and containment, if any, the initial dilution achieved, the dispersal characteristics,
water characteristics (temperature, pH, salinity, stratification, oxygen indices, and productivity), the bottom
characteristics, and whether an adequate scientific basis exists for assessing the consequences of the
proposed dumping. Section C consists of general considerations including the practical availability of
alternative land-based methods of treatment, disposal or elimination.
55 London Convention, supra note 2, art. V (Article V provides that a special permit may be issued
for items listed on the black list "in emergencies, posing unacceptable risk relating to human health and
admitting no other feasible solution.").
56 London Convention, supra note 2, art. V.
57 London Convention, supra note 2, art. VII, § 4.
58 London Convention, supra note 2, art. VII, § 1.
59 London Convention, supra note 2, art. VII, § 2.
60 London Convention, supra note 2, art. X. "In accordance with the principles of international law
regarding State responsibility for damage to the environment of other States or to any other area of the
environment, caused by dumping of wastes and other matter of all kinds, the Contracting Parties undertake
to develop procedures for the assessment of liability and the settlement of disputes regarding dumping."
Id. In response to this, the Parties amended the Convention in 1978 with procedures concerning dispute
settlement. LDC 6(111). However, the procedures will not come into force until the sixtieth day after the
date on which they are accepted by two thirds of the Contracting Parties. Id. art. XV(I)(a). As of 1990
only 14 of 65 states (21%) had ratified the 1978 amendment. While Japan has accepted the amendment
which provides for settling disputes through arbitration or the International Court of Justice and therefore
appears willing to subject its actions to third party control, Russia has not. See THE FIRST DECADE, supra
note 32, at 133.
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Because The London Convention recognizes the need to accommo-
date regional needs and encourages "[s]tates with a common interest in
particular geographical areas to enter into appropriate agreements supple-
mentary to this Convention," 61 parties are free to implement binding
enforcement on a regional level. However, there are no regional agreements
pertaining to the prevention of pollution within the Sea of Japan or
providing for compulsory dispute resolution between the countries
bordering the Sea of Japan. While the London Convention currently lacks
effective enforcement provisions of its own, increasing international accep-
tance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS") is apt to provide a mechanism for enforcing the London
Convention.
2. UNCLOS
The most influential international treaty regulating the use of the
world's oceans is the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.62 However, UNCLOS has only been in force since November 16,
1994. Russia and Japan are both signatories to UNCLOS but neither has
ratified the convention.63 Some commentators associate binding effect of a
treaty with states that are signatories, 64 but UNCLOS itself states that the
Convention shall enter into force twelve months after the sixtieth instrument
of ratification or accession and thirty days following each subsequent
ratification or accession (emphasis added). 65 While it is likely that both
Russia and Japan will ratify UNCLOS in the near future, the provisions of
UNCLOS that expand upon customary law will not be binding on either
Russia or Japan until they ratify or accede to the treaty.
The import of widespread acceptance of UNCLOS should not be
underestimated. In addition to its own prescriptions, UNCLOS, in article
210.4, states that global rules, standards, and recommended practices to
control pollution by dumping shall be established by competent interna-
tional organizations or diplomatic conference. 66 The London Convention is
a competent international organization as it was established by the United
61 London Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.
62 See Law of the Sea, supra note 40.
63 See Law of the Sea, supra note 40.
64 Canfield, supra note 4, at 359.
65 Law of the Sea, supra note 40, art. 308.
66 Law of the Sea, supra note 40, art. 210.4.
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Nations and reports to the International Maritime Organization. Therefore,
it is consistent with UNCLOS to incorporate the global prescriptions of the
London Convention into UNCLOS.
Two interesting situations result from UNCLOS's incorporating the
prescriptions of the London Convention by reference. First, states that are
parties to both the London Convention and UNCLOS will be subject to the
binding enforcement provisions of UNCLOS for violations of the London
Convention.67  Second, states that are only subject to UNCLOS will be
legally bound by amendments to the London Convention while states that
are only subject to the London Convention will continue to be able to opt
out of unfavorable provisions. 68
3. Customary International Law
Customary law reflects international concern for the impacts of one
state's activities on other states by limiting state sovereignty.69 The same
concerns set forth in 1972 by Stockholm Convention principles 7 and 21
were reiterated twenty years later in 1992 in the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development. 70  The Rio Declaration adds to the
67 Law of the Sea, supra note 40, pt. XV. Among the dispute settlement provisions are compulsory
procedures entailing binding decisions that will apply to acts in contravention of international rules and
standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Law of the Sea, supra note 40, pt.
Xv.
68 Clearly, this provides incentive for all member States of UNCLOS to also join and participate in
the London Convention.
69 In 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference)
adopted a declaration on the Human Environment, which set forth a general obligation of States to preserve
and protect the marine environment in the two following principles:
Principle 7: States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that
are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage
amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea....
Principle 21: States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972 (United Nations
publication, Sales No. E.73.Il.A.14 and corrigendum), ch. I [hereinafter STOCKHOLM DECLARATION]; THE
FIRST DECADE, supra note 32 at 42. The relation between Principle 7 and Principle 21 result in
recognizing a limit to state sovereignty which prohibits a state from conducting activities that adversely
affect areas or persons outside that state's control. Developments in the Law: International Environmental
Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1496 (1991) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
70 U.N. Doc. A/conf. 151/26 (vol. 1), Aug. 12, 1992. Principle I: "Human beings are at the center of
concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Stockholm convention by recognizing the technological differences
between developing and developed states and by encouraging international
cooperation in conserving, protecting, and restoring the Earth's
ecosystem. 71 While these broad prescriptions of acceptable behavior are
effective as guidelines, they are sufficiently broad to allow multiple inter-
pretations.
Resolution of disputes using customary law depends on the willing-
ness of the disputants to agree on what is customary. 72 Perhaps one of the
most commonly accepted axioms of customary international law is that a
state is liable for actions that damage another state's territory.73 However,
in order for liability to attach, actual damage and a causal connection
between the action and resulting damage must be established with clear and
convincing evidence.74
III. RUSSIAN DUMPING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE INTO THE SEA OF JAPAN:
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Analysis of the legality of Russia's action in dumping liquid low-
level waste into the sea of Japan in 1993 requires evaluating Russia's
actions with respect to the express provisions of the London Convention
and the general prescriptions of customary international law. There are no
nature." Principle 2: "States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction." Principle 7: "States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global
environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed
countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable
development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the
technologies and financial resources they command." Id.
71 Id.
72 MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 3 (1987). There
are several theories on how customary law develops. The theory preferred by the Soviets is the Consensual
Theory which essentially states that states choose which principles of law will apply to them. This theory
avoids the problems of applying a rule that is inconsistent with the internal policies of a state that can result
by declaring that customary law is the law practiced by the majority of states. Id at 3 1.
73 Developments in the Law, supra note 69, at 1496.
74 Developments in the Law, supra note 69, at 1494. The general authority for this principle comes
from the 1938 Trail Smelter arbitration. Trail Smelter (US v. Can), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938 (1941). While the
Trail Smelter arbitration involved the voluntary submission of Canada and the United States, legal scholars
and international acceptance have transformed what was originally a narrow statement applicable to only
the United States and Canada into a broad statement of customary law. Developments in the Law, supra
note 69, at 1496-1497.
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regional agreements regulating activities within the Sea of Japan and it is
unnecessary to evaluate Russia's actions with respect to UNCLOS, as
Russia has yet to accede to that agreement.
A. Russia 's Actions with Respect to The London Convention
The London Convention became binding on the USSR on January 29,
1976.75 With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has
assumed the international responsibilities of its predecessor.76
It is not clear whether Russia's radwaste dumping in 1993 violated
the London Convention because the Convention, as written, is vague.
Additionally, the ineffective enforcement provisions of the London
Convention make determining the legality of Russia's action
inconsequential. However, a step by step application of the Convention to
the facts associated with the Sea of Japan dumping incident is instructive in
illustrating several weaknesses of the London Convention.
Examining three areas of the Convention in detail illustrate major
weaknesses of the London Convention. First, the sovereign immunity
exemption potentially exempts the majority of the earth's radioactive wastes
from the Convention. 77 Second, even if sovereign immunity does not apply,
there was sufficient ambiguity in the wording of protocol for the dumping
of low level radwaste to argue that Russia's actions did not violate the intent
of the regulations. Lastly, the ineffective enforcement provisions of the
London Convention necessitate reliance on customary law for establishing
international liability.
1. Sovereign Immunity Exemption
The London Convention is consistent with the general trend of inter-
national conventions in exempting the actions of state owned or operated
vessels and aircraft. 78 The exemption is not absolute, as States are required
to adopt measures that will ensure their vessels "act in a manner consistent
75 THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32, at 132.
76 Jason H. Eaton, Kicking the Habit: Russia's Addiction to Nuclear Waste Dumping at Sea, 23
DENV. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y 287, 296 (1995); Facts and Problems, supra note 3, § 2.2 at 20.
77 In 1993, The Russian navy alone possessed 394 nuclear reactors which was sixty percent of the
world's nuclear reactors. Facts and Problems, supra note 3, at 46.
78 THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32, at 82.
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with the object and purpose of [the] Convention." 79 The object and purpose
of the Convention is stated in article I of the Convention and proclaims that:
Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively promote
the effective control of all sources of pollution of the marine
environment, and pledge themselves especially to take all
practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the
dumping of waste and other matter that is liable to create
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine
life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate
uses of the sea.8 0
The London Convention's prescription that charges vessels enjoying
sovereign immunity with the obligation to be consistent with the object and
purpose of the Convention is subject to different interpretations. The
United States interprets the above requirement broadly and subjects its state
vessels to the same level of regulations as private vessels. 8' Russia, on the
other hand, reads the provision narrowly and has recognized only the
responsibility to notify the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA")8 2
of the discharges of its ships enjoying sovereign immunity.8 3 Clearly,
notifying the IAEA of dumping has no connection with the level of hazards
to human health or the environment posed by the dumping. However,
article I only requires that the party take all practicable steps to prevent the
dumping. Thus, the inclusion of the word "practicable" in article I allows
for each party to decide the extent to which it will subject its state vessels to
London Convention prescriptions.
Sovereign immunity will likely apply to the 1993 dumping incident
in the Sea of Japan, as the Russians complied with their interpretation of the
79 London Convention, supra note 2, art. VII, § 4.
80 London Convention, supra note 2, art. I.
81 The United States has codified these restrictions in the Marine Protection Research Sanctuary Act.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1402-14. The United States has not yet incorporated the Convention's ban on all radioactive
waste dumping into positive law. See 33 U.S.C. § 1414; The Ocean Radioactive Dumping Ban Act of
1994, H.R. Rep. No. 522, 103d Cong., (May 23, 1994), available in WESTLAW, LH Database; H.B. 1154,
104th Cong., (1995), available in WESTLAW, US-BILLTRK Database.
82 The parties to the London Convention have delegated the responsibility to define "high level
radioactive wastes unsuitable for dumping at sea, and to [provide] recommendations for issuing permits for
dumping at sea" to the IAEA. Aide-Memoire on Dumping of Liquid Radioactive Waste by The Russian
Federation in The Sea of Japan, 9 INT'L ORGANIZATIONS & THE LAW OF THE SEA, DOCUMENTARY Y.B.
753, 755 (1993) (Neth. Inst. for the Law of the Sea) [hereinafter Aide-Memoire].
83 Facts and Problems, supra note 3, at 8.
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London Convention's sovereign immunity exemption. The dumping
occurred from a Russian navy vessel, 84 and the Russian's letter to the IAEA
on October 5, 1993 represents the Russian view that the dumping was the
only practicable option.85  Allowing nations complete discretion to
determine when sovereign immunity applies has the potential to undermine
the effectiveness of the London Convention. In addition, if state action is
not regulated to the same extent as private action, international control of
ocean dumping of radwaste will be practically nonexistent. 86
If it is argued that Russia did not exhaust all practicable steps, then
the sovereign immunity exemption will not apply to the dumping.
Recognizing that the phrase "all practicable steps" is flexible, a plausible
argument exists that even though the Russians characterized the dumping as
an emergency situation, 87 it was "practicable" for them to follow the
Convention's guidelines for emergencies. 88 The Convention requires the
dumping state to supply prior notice to countries that are likely to be
affected by the dumping and to comply, to the maximum extent feasible,
with the recommendations of the appropriate organizations. 89 The Russians
did not notify neighboring countries90 or the International Maritime
84 Hadfield & MacKenzie, supra note 27.
85 See Aide-Memoire, supra note 82, at 754. Mr. V. 1. Danilov-Danilyan, Minister of the Russian
Federation Ministry of Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources sent the following letter to the
Director General of the IAEA on October 5, 1993:
1 wish to inform you that in view of the complex situation concerning the handling of
radioactive waste from nuclear-powered submarines, which matter is treated in detail in the
White Book ('Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to
the Territory of the Russian Federation') and considering the critical state of the floating storage
facilities for liquid radioactive waste at the bases of the Pacific Fleet, we have of necessity
authorized the disposal of liquid radioactive waste in Area No. 9 (see White Book) in the Sea of
Japan on a once-only-basis.
Aide-Memoire, supra note 82, 754.
86 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. The members present at the Twelfth Consultative
Meeting agreed that the definition of dumping contained in article lII(l)(a)(ii) and the requirement to act in
a manner consistent with objectives and purposes of the convention applied "to the disposal at sea of any
vessel, whether military or non-military, nuclear-powered or non-nuclear-powered, commissioned or
decommissioned." THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 30, at 83 (In effect this eliminated the sovereign
immunity exemption for disposing of state owned vessels.).
87 Radioactive Waste: Russian Officials Admit to Dumping 900 Cubic Meters of Waste in Sea of
Japan, 201 DAILY ENv'T REP. (BNA) d-5, Oct. 20, 1993, available in WESTLAW, BNA-ENV Database
[hereinafter Radioactive Waste].
88 London Convention, supra note 2, art. V, § 2.
89 London Convention, supra note 2, art. V, § 2.
90 See Japan Demands End, supra note 7.
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Organization ("IMO") and did not wait for recommendations from the
IAEA.9 1
Even if it is established that Russia did not take all practicable steps
to avoid the dumping, in order to find that the purpose of the Convention
was violated, it must further be shown that the dumping was liable to create
hazards to human health or the environment or that the dumping interfered
with other legitimate uses of the sea. There is neither evidence that other
legitimate uses of the sea were impacted nor conclusive scientific evidence
that dumping between two and three curies of radioactivity 100 kilometers
from shore is hazardous to human health or living resources. 92
The weaknesses of the sovereign immunity exemption illustrated
above have not changed with the adoption of a permanent ban on low-level
radwaste disposal.
2. Restrictions for Low-level Waste Disposal
If sovereign immunity does not apply to the event, then Russia's
actions will be subject to the prescriptions of the London Convention as it
existed in October of 1993. 93 In October of 1993, the London Convention
distinguished between high-level and low-level radioactive wastes.94 The
disposal of 900 tons of liquid radioactive waste with a radioactivity level of
two micro curies per kilogram95 is not within the definition of high-level
waste96 and is therefore considered low-level waste. At the time of the
incident, low-level radwastes were subject to the restrictions of an annex II
listed material. In addition, the moratorium on low-level radwaste disposal
implemented by resolution LDC.21(9) was still in effect. However, this
resolution was non-binding as it merely requested the contracting parties to
91 See London Convention, supra note 2, art. V(2); Aide-Memoire, supra note 82, at 754.
92 The scientific report prepared for the Ninth Consultative Meeting showed neither that dumping of
low-level radwastes at sea was environmentally dangerous nor that it was harmless. THE FIRST DECADE,
supra note 32, at 105.
93 The same analysis is still valid for current Russian dumping as a result of Russia's objection to the
permanent prohibition of low-level waste. However, all other Parties to the London Convention as well as
Parties to UNCLOS (see infra Part III.A.3) are prohibited from all radwaste disposal. See Declarations of
Non-Acceptance, supra note 8.
94 As a result of Russia's objection to the permanent prohibition of low-level waste, the distinction
between high-level and low-level waste is currently important only for Russia. See Declarations of Non-
Acceatance, supra note 8.
5 Kiyoshi Sakurai, From Russia with Love: Oceans Around Japan Full of Nuclear Waste, 62
TOKYO BUSINESS TODAY, Apr. 1994, at 36-38.
96 London Convention, supra note 2, annex I, § 6. The IAEA definition of high-level radioactive
waste is described in supra note 51.
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suspend radioactive dumping and did not alter the terms of the
Convention. 97
To determine if Russia properly granted a special permit pursuant to
article IV, for the dumping of an annex II listed substance, it is necessary to
evaluate the dumping activity with respect to IAEA guidelines. The
authority to institute guidelines for low-level radwaste dumping was dele-
gated to the IAEA.98 Even though Russia did not comply with several of
the IAEA's recommendations, a strict reading of the Convention concludes
that the IAEA regulations are merely guidelines and that the only require-
ment is that the nation desiring to dump low-level radwaste consider the
factors listed in annex III prior to issuing a special permit. After all, the
Convention itself says only that the "contracting Parties should take full
account of the recommendations of... the IAEA."
99
Even if the IAEA recommendations are elevated to the level of
prescriptions, Russia's actions do not appear to violate the policy behind the
prescriptions. The IAEA requires advance notice of radwaste dumping
activities, the presence during the dumping of an observer from a competent
international organization, that waste be contained in approved containers,
and that the dumping occur between 50'N and 50'S latitude and in depths
of at least 4,000 meters. 100 Russia notified the Secretariat of the IAEA of
the planned dumping, 10 1 and the reported disposal site was south of 50'N
latitude.102 However, the Russians failed to have an observer on board, did
not contain the waste in approved containers and the depth at the disposal
site was less than 4,000 meters. 103 Upon further analysis, these violations
appear to be technical rather than substantive violations of IAEA policy.
Even though an observer was not on board the Russian vessel,
Greenpeace followed the vessel and documented the dumping on video and
with Geiger counter measurements. 104 Members of Greenpeace may not
have been what the IAEA had in mind when requiring an observer from a
competent international organization but it is unlikely that an on-board
97 THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32, at 105.
98 THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32, at 72; London Convention, supra note 2, annex II § D
99 London Convention, supra note 2, annex I! § D (emphasis added).
100 Facts and Problems, supra note 3, at 8 (citing IAEA Requirements for Disposal of Radioactive
Waste at Sea, IAEA SAFETY SERIES No. 78 (Vienna, 1978)).
101 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
102 Facts and Problems, supra note 3, tbl. A5, at 66.
103 Facts and Problems, supra note 3, tbl. A5, at 66.
104 A. Varlamov, Russian Navy Resumes Dumping of Nuclear Waste in Sea of Japan, BBC SUMM.
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, BBCSWB File.
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observer from a sanctioned agency would have documented the events more
thoroughly.
Moreover, the assumption that radwaste disposal would be safe if the
disposal location is in depths greater than 4,000 meters is flawed. While it
is true that different areas of the ocean exhibit different levels of
productivity and thus different levels of risk in incorporating radioactivity
into the food chain, human understanding of the deep oceans remains in its
infancy. Indeed the very areas that were previously thought to be ideal for
disposal of radwaste due to low productivity have recently been reported to
support a wide variety of life.105
The most serious violation of IAEA protocol was the direct release of
the radwaste into the surface waters of the ocean. 106  Members of
Greenpeace recorded elevated levels of radioactivity at the time of
dumping, 107 but subsequent scientific investigations have been unable to
detect any damage whatsoever.108 Prior to the October 17, 1993 dumping,
Japan had conducted numerous studies to monitor the possible radioactive
contamination of the Sea of Japan. 109 While none of the studies detected
unusual levels of radioactivity, the conclusions were "of limited value, as
none of the surveys [were] able to collect samples in the actual dumping
area, which lies within Russia's 200-mile exclusive economic zone." 110
Immediately after the October 17, 1993 dumping, Japan commissioned the
research ship Meiyo to take measurements in the dumping zone. II No
changes in the environment were detected.1l 2 In March 1994, a joint
research expedition with government officials from Japan and scientists
from Russia, South Korea, and the IAEA took seawater and seabed
105 William J. Broad, The World's Deep, Cold Sea Floors Harbor a Riotous Diversity of Life, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at C1.
106 One of the IAEA's recommendations for ocean dumping of radwaste states: "The dumping of
unpackaged liquid radioactive waste into the deep sea shall be prohibited." Aide-Memoire, supra note 82,
at 757.
107 Japan Demands End, supra note 7.
108 Vasiliy Golovnin, Japanese Research Ship Reports No Sign of Radioactivity, BBC SUMM. OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, BBCSWB File; Okean
Expedition Finds No Ecological Damage From Nuclear Waste Dumping, BBC SUMM. OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Apr. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, BBCSWB File.
109 David Swinbanks, Japan to Study Damage From Russian Dumping, 365 NATURE 777 (Oct. 28,
1993).
110 Id. According to UNCLOS, coastal states have jurisdiction over marine scientific research
within their exclusive economic zone (200 miles). Law of the Sea, supra note 40, arts. 56(1)(b)(ii), 246(1).
111 Golovnin, supra note 108.
112 Golovnin, supra note 108.
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sediment samples at seven points in the Sea of Japan.113 Levels of radioac-
tivity at the dumping sites were found to be within normal background
levels of radiation. 114
The 1993 prohibition of low-level wastes by the London Convention
eliminates the need for the IAEA dumping protocol for all parties except
Russia. The IAEA restrictions continue to apply to Russian activity as a
result of Russia's opting out of the Convention's 1993 prohibition of low-
level radwaste. As previously explained, the Convention will not provide a
mechanism for the international community to stop Russian activity if
Russia should choose to continue to dump low-level radwastes. In addition
to the unenforceability of the IAEA regulations, it can be argued that Russia
will be consistent with the IAEA policies of documenting waste disposal
and disposing of wastes in a safe manner, if Russia models future dumping
activity on the procedures followed in the Sea of Japan.
3. Enforcement Provisions
The London Convention lacks effective provisions for international
enforcement. 115 The Convention has been unable to garner sufficient
support to implement international dispute resolution provisions.116 Instead
the Convention relies on each party to implement Article VII of the London
Convention, which requires flag states, port states, and coastal states to take
measures that will ensure compliance with the convention. 117 Because the
dumping activities of 1993 occurred within Russian jurisdiction"l8 by a
113 Radioactivity Monitoring Ship Heads For Sea of Japan, BBC SUM. OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
Mar. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, BBCSWB File.
114 Okean Expedition Finds No Ecological Damage From Nuclear Waste Dumping, supra note
108.
115 See THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32, at 93.116 See THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32, at 133.
! 17 London Convention, supra note 2, art. Vll, § 1.
Each Contracting Party shall apply the measures required to implement the present Convention
to all:
(a) vessels and aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag;(b) vessels and aircraft loading in its territory or territorial seas matter which is to be dumped;(c) vessels and aircraft and fixed or floating platforms under its jurisdiction believed to be
engaged in dumping."
London Convention, supra note 2, art. Vl1, § I.
118 The dumping occurred 90 miles south of Nakhodka. See A. Varlamov, Russian Navy Resumes
Dumping of Nuclear Waste in Sea of Japan, BBC SUMM. OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 19, 1993,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, BBCSWB File. Contra Joseph E. Schmitz & Robert F. Foxworth,
Coping with the New Russian Nuclear Threat: A Legal Alternative to Environmental Extortion, 6 GEO.
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Russian flagged vessel, which originated from a Russian port, 119 enforce-
ment under the Convention by countries other than Russia for the radwaste
dumping in the Sea of Japan in October is not possible.
The recent prohibition of low-level wastes does nothing to affect the
enforcement provisions of the London Convention. However, the ability of
UNCLOS to incorporate the terms of London Convention by reference in
combination with UNCLOS's provisions for binding enforcement may
render the London Convention's lack of enforcement mechanisms moot.120
B. Customary Law
Regardless of the London Convention's lack of effective enforcement
provisions and its sovereign immunity exemption, Russia will not escape
liability for its radioactive dumping, if harm can be causally linked to the
dumping activities. Proving harm with any degree of certainty, let alone the
customary law standard of clear and convincing evidence, 12 1 is highly
unlikely as surveys of the disposal site have been unable to detect any
residual elevation of radioactivity.122 Without evidence of harm to human
health or the environment, liability under customary law will not attach to
the 1993 dumping of radwastes in the Sea of Japan.
C. Current Russian Position on Ocean Disposal of Radioactive Wastes
and International Response.
As of January 1996, there have been no new reports of current
Russian radwaste dumping. Russia vowed in February 1994 that it would
"continue its endeavors to ensure that the sea is not polluted by the dumping
of wastes and other matter 123 but has routinely announced that it will be
forced to resume dumping unless it receives international aid to develop
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (1994) (authors incorrectly identified the location of the October 1993 Russian
dumping to have occurred "ninety miles from the Japanese city of Nakhodka" (italics added)). Nakhodka
is a Russian city located on the western shores of the Sea of Japan. NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF THE
WORLD 85 (6th ed. 1990).
119 Varlamov, supra note 104 (the Russian towed tender TNT-27 left the nuclear submarine base in
Pavlovsk, near Vladivostok).
120 See discussion on UNCLOS supra Part I.C.2.
121 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 110-12; Golovnin, supra note 108; Swinbanks, supra note
109.
123 Declarations of Non-Acceptance, supra note 8 (this statement was included in the Russian
objection to the prohibition of low-level radwaste dumping).
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suitable land based disposal sites. 124 The precarious nature of Russia's
nuclear disposal policy appears to result from a combination of military
downsizing and associated decommissioning of nuclear powered vessels
and nuclear weapons, a lack of adequate land storage facilities, and a lack of
sufficient economic resources to fund land disposal sites. 125 Alternatively,
it has been proposed that Russia may be using the possibility of continued
ocean disposal of radioactive wastes as a bargaining chip to obtain interna-
tional aid. 126
Regardless of the reasons for Russia's continued interest in ocean
disposal of radwastes, international refusal to offer aid or impose sanctions
may exacerbate the precarious nature of Russia's radioactive program and
result in additional Russian radwaste dumping. International assistance will
facilitate Russian storage of Russian generated radioactive wastes. Russia
will therefore become accountable for its past transgressions by ensuring
that the risks and hazards associated with its radioactivity be contained
within Russian land instead of externalized by spreading the risk of harm
over all ocean users. 127 Furthermore, article II of the Convention requires
contracting parties to collectively take measures "according to their
scientific, technical and economic capabilities" to prevent marine pollution
caused by dumping. 128 For these reasons, the approach taken by both Japan
and South Korea in offering economic and technical assistance 129 is
124 Reports of Russia's need or intention to resume radioactive waste dumping in the sea of Japan
have been continually reported since October 1993. As of November I, 1995, a LEXIS search of the BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts revealed that Russia's intent to resume dumping changed seven separate
times since October 1993.
125 See Eaton, supra note 76.
126 Schmitz & Foxworth, supra note 118, at 445; Sakurai, supra note 95.
127 See generally THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32, at 105-06 (citing an IAEA report prior to the
Russian disclosure that calculates the risk to individuals from past ocean dumping to peak in about 200
years at a level of less than one chance in a billion per year, and that "the aggregate exposure to the global
population from long-lived components of the dumped waste imply that the total casualties resulting from
past dumping may be up to about 1,000 spread over the next 10,000 years or so").
128 London Convention, supra note 2, art. II.
129 South Korea will provide Russia with a special container costing one million dollars for the
disposal of low-level nuclear waste. Kyonghyang Sinmun', South Korea to Provide Nuclear Waste
Disposal Facilities to Russia, BBC SUMM. OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, BBCSWB File. Japan has pledged 100 million dollars to help Russia dispose of nuclear
wastes. Sergei Agafonov, Experts Discuss Problem of Nuclear Dumping in Sea of Japan, THE CURRENT
DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, June 9, 1993, at 16. Japan's concern and willingness to assist Russia in
developing suitable land based disposal facilities is commendable. Yet, Japan's motivations are not
entirely altruistic. The successful transfer of Russian radwaste ocean disposal to permanent, safe Russian
land based facilities will reduce the risk of harm caused by bioaccumulation of radioactivity in the Sea of
Japan. In addition, the Japanese government may be able to shift national attention away from Japan's land
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consistent with the prescriptions of the London Convention and preferable
to either no action or a hard line stance against assisting a nation to comply
with international standards.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH AN ACTIVITY AND ECOSYSTEM LIMITED APPROACH TO
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
A. Problems In General
The goal of the London Convention in regulating and reducing
pollution by dumping is laudable, yet truly effective management of the
ocean ecosystem will not result from isolated regulations.130  Ocean
dumping is estimated to contribute only ten percent of ocean pollution. 13 1
Of that ten percent, radioactive wastes have routinely been ranked by the
United States Council on Environmental Quality as having the least
deleterious impact of all dumped material on the marine environment. 132
While it is true that protecting the environment requires regulating small as
well as large polluting activities, the strict prohibition of an activity that
poses relatively small risks may be shortsighted.
On its face, the complete prohibition of ocean dumping of radioactive
waste seems consistent with the London Convention's goal of preventing
marine pollution. However, even total compliance with a prohibition on
ocean dumping of radioactive waste will not alleviate the threat of radioac-
tive contamination of the oceans as radioactive material enters the ocean
environment from a variety of sources. 133 In addition, an activity specific
based radwaste pollution of the Sea of Japan that emanates from nuclear power facilities. See Sakurai.,
supra note 95.
130 The London Convention recognizes the need to control all sources of pollution of the marine
environment in article 1, but restricts its regulations to dumping. See London Convention, supra note 2, art.
1.
.1 31 THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32, at 44. The sources of pollution in decreasing order are:
land-based sources (44%), atmosphere (33%), maritime transportation (12%), dumping at sea (10%), and
offshore production (1%). THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32. at 44 (citing The State of the Marine
Environment, The United Nations Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution
("GESAMP") Rep. Stud. 39 (1990)).
132 Kindt, supra note 5, at 336-37. In 1970 and 1980 the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ") identified seven sources of ocean dumping. In decreasing order of their deleterious impact on the
marine environment are: dredge spoils, industrial wastes, sewage sludge, construction and demolition
debris, solid waste, explosives and chemical munitions, and radioactive wastes. Kindt, supra note 5, at
336-37.
133 "Dumping does not include: (1) the disposal at sea of wastes or other matter incidental to, or
derived from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea and
their equipment .... ." London Convention, supra note 2, art. III(I)(b). In addition to dumping,
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approach to regulating the disposal of wastes merely shifts the risks that
were previously associated with ocean dumping to another activity or to a
different ecosystem.
Prohibiting ocean dumping does nothing to reduce the amount of
hazardous material requiring disposal. In fact, it is quite possible that radio-
activity banned from direct dumping into the ocean will nevertheless find its
way to the sea via land based runoff or atmospheric fallout. For example,
even though Japan has not reported dumping radioactive waste into the
oceans since 1969,134 the effluent from Japan's land based nuclear power
plants annually contributes 13,000 curies of radioactivity to coastal
waters. 135 This radioactivity flows directly into the sea but does not fall
under the auspices of the London Convention as land based sources of
pollution are not covered in the Convention's definition of dumping. 136 It
makes neither scientific nor political sense to prohibit the disposal of radi-
oactive wastes hundreds of miles off shore where biological productivity is
relatively low, but to permit the discharge of radioactivity in coastal areas
where biological productivity is relatively high.
Another consequence of prohibiting direct disposal of radioactivity in
the oceans without reducing the amount of radioactive material generated is
radioactivity is present in the oceans from naturally present radioactivity, atmospheric fallout, and runoff
from land based operations.
The total amount of radioactivity dumped in the ocean, some 6 x 104 TBq [this number triples
with the recent disclosure of Russian radioactive waste dumping, but remains dwarfed by other
sources of radioactivity], is much less than the approximately 2 x 108 TBq that were added to
the oceans as a result of the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons between 1954 and 1962.
This in turn, is only 1% of the 2 x10 10 TBq that exists naturally in the ocean. [One TBq (tera
bequeral) = 1012 Bq, where I Bq arises from one nuclear disintegration per second.] However,
the mix of radioisotopes involved is different in each case and radioisotopes vary widely in the
extent to which they can affect marine organisms and man, so that the total radioactivity is only
a very rough guide to the risk. It must also be stated that the dumping cannot be considered safe
just because the releases of radionuclides are small compared to the natural incidence of
radionuclides in the environment.
Bewers & Garrett, supra note 33, at 105-06.
134 Facts and Problems, supra note 3, at 14 (citing data from Inventory of Radioactive Material
Entering the Marine Environment: Sea Disposal of Radioactive Waste, IAEA Tec. Doc. 588 (Mar. 1991)).131 Sakurai, supra note 95. "The Tokyo Electric Power Company alone is allowed to discharge 390
billion becquerels of radioactivity a year from plants bordering the Sea of Japan. The Russians were quick
to point out that this is 10 times the amount dumped from their ship." Hadfield & MacKenzie, supra note
27, at 6. Russia's Deputy Ecology Minister Nikolai Rybalsky reported that the amount dumped totaled two
to three curies. Radioactive Waste, supra note 86. One curie is equal to about 37 billion becquerels. See
Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 22, at 121 tbl. I.
136 London Convention, supra note 2, art. 1Il. Dumping is defined as "any deliberate disposal at
sea of wastes." London Convention, supra note 2, art. Ill, § I(a)(i). The word "sea" is defined as "all
marine waters other than the internal waters of States." London Convention, supra note 2, art. III, § 3.
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that the risk of harm is at least initially transferred to another ecosystem.
An ecosystem-specific view to regulating activities as implemented in the
London Convention does not attempt to determine where the lowest level of
risk exists but rather considers only the direct effects of permitting or
prohibiting an activity on the subject ecosystem. 137
The ease of regulating any given activity or ecosystem is independent
of the risk associated with that activity. Within any ecosystem, discrete
activities, such as dumping, will be the first to be regulated because their
limited nature facilitates human intervention. In addition, nation states are
more likely to agree to regulating shared resources, such as the ocean, than
they are to agree to relinquish sovereign control over national territory. As
a result, the activities first regulated will not necessarily be those that pose
the greatest threat to human health or the environment but will consist of
discrete activities conducted with shared resources. The recent prohibition
of ocean dumping of radioactive wastes exemplifies this theory as radioac-
tive wastes are considered by the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality to
pose less of a threat to the marine environment than dredge spoils, industrial
wastes, sewage sludge, construction and demolition debris, solid waste,
explosives, and chemical munitions. 138 And dumping accounts for only ten
percent of all marine pollution. 139
B. Problems with the Precautionary Approach
The precautionary approach is sound in theory but should not be
applied to all environmental regulations without prior analysis of the
prohibition's global impact. The use of precautionary principles in envi-
ronmental regulations condones restricting activities without requiring a
causal link to harm. 140 The precautionary approach can be both environ-
mentally and economically advantageous as human knowledge of the
environmental impacts of an activity are often incomplete, and "it is
137 Prior to the prohibition of low-level wastes, evaluating the practical availability of alternative
land-based methods was encouraged. See THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32, at 152-53; Amendments to
the Guidelines for the Application ofAnnex 111, LONDON CONVENTION RESOLUTION LDC.32(l 1) (1989).
138 Kindt, supra note 5, at 336-37.
139 THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 32, at 44.
140 The precautionary principle in general shifts the burden from the traditional common law
approach of allowing an activity unless and until a causal connection between the activity and harm can be
shown and places the burden on the proponent of the action to show that the activity will not cause harm.
See Fullem, supra note 1. See Amendments, supra note 2. London Convention resolution LC.44(14)
adopted the principle of precautionary action as recommended by the Governing Council of the United
Nations in decision 15/27 of 25 May 1989. LDC.44(14), supra note 36.
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generally preferable to prevent pollution than to deal with pollution after it
has occurred."141 In the precautionary approach the proponent of an activity
generally has the burden of showing that the activity is safe.
The ease in which the precautionary approach enables activities to be
prohibited is both a strength and a weakness. The strength is that activities
are prevented before they harm an environment. The weakness is that a
wide range of activities in an entire ecosystem can be prohibited without
considering the impacts on other environments. The ability to close off
entire ecosystems without regard for the effects of the closure on other
ecosystems runs the risk of creating greater environmental harm.
After all, with hazardous material that has already been generated, the
questions are what is the safest method of disposal and where is the safest
location for disposal, not whether disposal is necessary. Indeed, the parties
to the London Convention, by prohibiting ocean disposal of low-level
radwastes, eliminated disposal across seventy-one percent of the earth's
surface 42 with apparent disregard for the risks presently associated with
land disposal.
While completely accurate global analysis of the risks associated with
many hazardous activities is beyond human capability, simplistic activity
specific evaluations do not attempt to minimize the risk to human health or
the environment. It is quite possible that at least some types of radwaste
disposal will pose less of a risk in a particular area of the ocean than they
will on land. It is for this reason that the parties to the London Convention
should re-evaluate their implementation of the precautionary approach and
keep all options for radwaste disposal open until a truly permanent and safe
disposal method is developed.
V. CONCLUSION
The London Convention's strength comes not from enforcement but
from voluntary compliance. The London Convention is a flexible document
that lacks teeth for enforcing voluntarily agreed to provisions. It allows
states to completely withdraw from the Convention or to opt out of specific
amendments. The opt-out provisions are evidence of the continuing impor-
tance that states place on sovereignty as well as the desire of the contracting
141 James E. Hickey & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International
Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 423 (1995).
142 Kindt, supra note 5, at 335.
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parties to promote honesty. Since a state will not be bound to prescriptions
that it opts out of, there is incentive for a state to honestly represent its
intent.
However, the lack of effective enforcement provisions counters the
incentive for honesty. An honest state will be subjected to international
pressure to conform, while a dishonest state will avoid the international
pressure to conform and will escape international liability for its actions
unless they are shown to cause harm to another state's resources. Of course,
the violating state will be subject to international condemnation if and when
its violations are discovered, but, as the Russians and Soviets before them
have shown, nation states may be willing to risk future embarrassment or
sanctions for the appearance of present conformity.
Notwithstanding the ability to cheat, voluntary compliance with the
provisions of the London Convention remains high. The current setback
regarding Russian noncompliance with the prohibition on dumping
radioactive waste may be just a blip along the path to total abstinence from
using the oceans as a radioactive dump. In fact, provisions for effective
international enforcement of the London Convention's provisions may
finally be a reality. If the London Convention is accepted by UNCLOS as a
competent international organization, the mechanisms for binding enforce-
ment within UNCLOS will apply to the London Convention's regulations.
The near universal acceptance of a total prohibition on ocean disposal
of radwaste illustrates the potential danger of adopting a precautionary
approach for a single activity in a single ecosystem. Now that seventy-one
percent of the earth's surface has been declared off limits as a disposal site
for radwastes, terrestrial sites must be found regardless of the risks to
human health or the environment.
While it is true that protecting the oceans from becoming a global
dump prevents nations from externalizing the risks associated with
hazardous activities, the ultimate goal should be to minimize the global
risks to human health and the environment. If indeed, it is determined that a
particular portion of the ocean is the safest location for a specific type of
disposal, the fact that the ocean is a shared resource should not prevent its
utilization. Instead, international mechanisms should be established to
regulate and protect the global environment. For example, imposing fees
for using shared resources could be tied to the risks associated with an
activity. These fees could then be used for monitoring and mitigating
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adverse impacts as well as for research and development of safer disposal
techniques.
The sanctity that states place on sovereignty is presently an insur-
mountable hurdle to effective and comprehensive global regulation of
activities with environmental impacts. States are unlikely to relinquish total
control of their domestic activities to international organizations. However,
the parties to the London Convention should seek to minimize environ-
mental harm caused by ocean dumping by altering their implementation of
the precautionary approach to consider the global impact of their ecosystem
specific regulations.

